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Pension incomes in the European Union: 
policy reform strategies in comparative perspective 
 
1. Introduction 
According to many commentators, one of the most important problems facing the 
majority of the European Union (EU) Member States in the coming years is related to the 
rapid ageing of their populations and the concomitant difficulties in the ability of their social 
protection systems to maintain the living standards of their senior citizens. In most EU 
countries "defined benefit" Pay-As-You-Go pension systems are in operation. With the 
anticipated decline in the ratio of workers to pensioners, serious doubts have been expressed 
regarding their sustainability. Broadly speaking, two types of policies have been 
recommended in the public discourse in order to avoid the collapse of the system: (i) policies 
aiming to move the pensions systems closer to "defined contributions" rather than "defined 
benefits" and/or promote private insurance schemes and (ii) policies aiming to modify the 
existing arrangements, without altering their main characteristics. The most important of the 
policy recommendations of the second type come under the headings of (a) Delayed 
retirement, (b) Lower replacement rates, (c) Increased social insurance contributions rates, 
and (d) Introduction or extension of systems of minimum (solidarity) pensions in order to 
avoid situations of extreme poverty and deprivation among the senior citizens. Our paper 
focuses on proposals aiming to modify existing arrangements, rather than altering the very 
nature of the pension systems. 
While studies examining the fiscal consequences of these types of proposal can be 
found in the literature,
2 relatively little detailed attention has been paid to the likely 
distributional impact of these recommendations, especially in the short-run. This is an 
important gap, since, as the experience of many EU countries suggests. the short-term 
political acceptability and longer-term sustainability of the reform proposals may depend 
primarily on distributional rather than fiscal considerations. Our paper attempts to fill this gap 
by providing estimates of the likely short-term effects of policy reforms of the type (b)-(d), if 
such reforms were to be introduced in the existing social protection systems of four European 
countries representing different “welfare-state regimes” [Esping-Andersen (1990), Ferrera 
(1996)]: Denmark (“social-democratic”), Germany (“corporatist”), Italy (“southern”) and the 
UK (“liberal”). For the purposes of our analysis we use EUROMOD, a detailed static 
microsimulation model covering all 15 (pre-May 2004) EU Member States. As well as the 
fiscal implications of the reforms, emphasis is placed on their likely impact on the gap 
between the elderly and non-elderly and on the poverty status of the two groups. Detailed 
comparisons are performed under alternative scenaria and similarities and differences across 
countries are identified. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a detailed 
description of the current situation of elderly and non-elderly in EU countries using data from 
the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) and estimates derived using EUROMOD. 
Section 3 discusses the use of static micro-simulation methods to evaluate pension reforms. 
Section 4 analyses the separate effects of three policy reforms: the introduction (or 
enhancement) of systems of minimum pensions, lower replacement rates and increased social 
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insurance contributions rates. Section 5 describes the impact of combinations of the above 
reforms. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2.  Incomes and poverty of elderly persons in the EU 
One of the main objectives of most pension systems is to provide elderly citizens with 
sufficiently high incomes, so that their living standards do not lag seriously behind those of 
the rest of the population, and so that they do not live in poverty. Therefore, we start by 
examining the current situation in the EU in these respects. Table 1 provides a snapshot 
picture of the income position of the elderly (persons aged 65+) in the 15 (pre- May 2004) EU 
Member States using the information from the 2000 wave (with incomes for 1999), of the 
European Community Household Panel (ECHP).
3  The first row shows that the share of 
elderly persons living in private households varies between 11.1% in Ireland and 19.3% in 
Greece. This variation depends both on the demographic structure of the population and on 
institutional arrangements for care of the elderly.
4 The second line reports the ratio of the 
mean equivalent disposable income of the elderly to the mean equivalent disposable income 
of the non-elderly.
5  In most countries the percentage is between 80% and 100%. It is lowest 
in Denmark with a ratio of 78% while in the Netherlands the average income of the elderly is 
4% higher than that of the non-elderly. Although in most countries the elderly lag behind the 
non-elderly, in most of them the differences are not as large as the differences observed ten or 
fifteen years ago [ISSAS (1990), Hagenaars et al (1994), Tsakloglou (1996a, 1996b)].
6  
While in aggregate the incomes of the elderly are reasonably close to those of the 
working aged in all countries, there is much more variation in the extent to which poverty 
occurs among the elderly, compared with the rest of the population. In four countries (the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy and Sweden) the poverty rate of the elderly is lower than that 
of the non-elderly – by a very large margin in the case of the Netherlands – while in Germany 
there is no difference in the poverty rates of the two groups. On the contrary, in Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, Ireland and, especially, Denmark, the poverty rates of the elderly are more 
than twice as high as those of the non-elderly. As a result, the share of the elderly in aggregate 
poverty varies enormously; from 3.5% in the Netherlands to 40.2% in Denmark.
7 However, 
since in many countries a considerable proportion of the elderly receive a pension that is 
slightly lower than the poverty line, the elderly may be poor but, on average, they may be less 
                                                           
3  The ECHP is an ambitious effort at collecting information on the living standards of the households of 
the EU member-states using common definitions, information collection methods and editing procedures. It 
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methodology, throughout the paper we use the “modified OECD” equivalence scale, which assigns a weight of 1 
to the household head, weights of 0.5 to every other adult in the household and 0.3 to each child (person aged 
below 14) in the household. 
6  The estimates reported in Table 1 are not strictly comparable with the estimates of these studies, 
primarily because the latter’s concept of resources includes incomes in-kind. 
7  It is worth noting that alternative sources of micro-data may show other patterns. For example, the 2001 
Danish Law Model database  (European Commission, 2003; Table 2) gives an at risk of poverty rate of 8% for 
non-elderly adults – which compares well with the ECHP estimate for all non-elderly in Table 1. However the 
corresponding estimate for the elderly is 24%, much lower than the ECHP figure of 31%. 3   
 
 
likely than the non-elderly poor to be located far below the poverty line. Table 1 provides 
estimates of the poverty index of Foster et al (1984).
8  In seven countries (Spain, Finland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK) the estimates for the elderly are 
lower – sometimes substantially so – than the estimates for the non-elderly. In three countries 
the estimates for the two groups are very close (Germany, France and Portugal) and only in 
five countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Greece and Ireland) the estimates for the elderly 
are clearly higher than those for the non-elderly. Once again, the contribution of the elderly to 
the aggregate poverty index varies considerably across countries; from around 2% in the 
Netherlands and Sweden to almost 40% in Denmark. 
Clearly, an important part of the explanation for poverty among the elderly lies in the 
pension systems. The final row of table 1 shows the share of pensions in the incomes of the 
elderly, at the individual level. Again the aggregate picture is one of relative uniformity with 
the share of pensions in the incomes of those aged over 64 varying between 81% and 91% in 
all countries apart from the UK (76%). Thus to explain the widely diverging patterns of 
poverty among the elderly we must investigate what lies behind these averages and the nature 
of the pension systems themselves. For example, high levels of poverty intensity indicate that 
pension coverage may be incomplete, or that the levels of some pensions are very low. High 
rates of poverty with low intensity suggest that the general level of pension is too low. 
Devising reform strategies involves taking existing inadequacies of level, structure and 
coverage of existing systems into account.  
In the next step we focus on the four countries of interest, using EUROMOD, a tax-
benefit model for the European Union [see Immervoll et al. (1999) for a general description]. 
Tax-benefit models calculate disposable income for each household in a representative set of 
micro-data. The datasets used as the basis for this paper are listed in Appendix 1. They were 
chosen on the grounds that they provide the best quality input for a tax-benefit model and are 
at the same time available and accessible to an international scientific project. Although they 
include data collected at various points around the mid-1990s, they have all been adjusted to 
1998 prices and incomes and, where necessary gross incomes have been imputed from net 
[Immervoll and O’Donoghue (2001)]. The calculation of household disposable income is 
made up of elements of gross income taken (or imputed) from the survey data combined with 
elements of income – taxes and benefits – that are simulated by the model. For the purposes 
of the paper, the calculations are performed once for the 1998 tax-benefit system, and again 
for each alternative scenario. The first round effect of the simulated change is the arithmetic 
difference in the “before” and “after” calculations. 
                                                           
8  We set the poverty aversion parameter of the index at a=2 (FGT(2)). For this value, the index is 
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Table 1. Relative income position of elderly people in EU countries (ECHP, 2000) 
 
 AT  BE  DK  D  E  EL FIN FR IRL IT LUX NL  PT SWE  UK 
Population share of the elderly (65+) %  15.2 16.8 14.8 17.6 16.8 19.3 14.7 16.2 11.1 16.7 14.8 12.8 14.9 15.5  18.1 
Income ratio
1 0.90 0.80 0.78 0.97 0.89 0.84 0.83 0.94 0.81 1.00 0.95 1.04 0.83 0.91  0.83 
Poverty rate of elderly %  23.1 23.7 31.3 10.7 18.6 31.2 19.4 18.6 42.1 13.2 8.7 2.8 32.7 9.9  24.1 
Poverty rate of non-elderly %  9.6 11.4 8.0 10.7 17.9 17.2 9.4 15.0 17.4 19.5 12.4 11.6 18.8 11.3  17.4 
Contribution of elderly to aggr. pov. rate %  30.3 29.4 40.2 17.6 17.4 30.2 26.2 19.4 23.2 12.0 10.8 3.5 23.4 14.0  23.4 
FGT(a=2) elderly (*100)
2 2.10 1.95 2.40 1.26 1.28 4.25 0.48 1.42 2.59 1.09 0.27 0.19 2.97 0.24  2.12 
FGT(a=2) non-elderly (*100)  0.90 1.28 0.66 1.22 2.84 2.83 0.91 1.43 1.78 3.38 0.69 1.50 2.94 2.13  2.70 
Contribution of elderly to FGT(a=2) %  29.5 23.6 38.7 18.2 8.4 26.4 8.3 16.1 15.4 6.0 6.3 1.9 15.0 2.0  14.8 
Share of pensions in elderly incomes
3 % 85.0 86.1 81.0 90.1 86.4 83.9 86.4 90.6 80.4 87.8 85.0 90.9 84.5 90.2  76.9 
Source: ECHP (2000 – own calculations) 
1. Income ratio: mean equivalent income of persons aged 65+/ mean equivalent income of persons aged below 65 
2. FGT (a=2): Foster, Greer and Thorebecke index of poverty using poverty aversion parameter a= 2.0 (x100) 
3. Pensions are defined as in ECHP variable PI132: Old age pension basic schemes, Old age pension supplementary schemes, Old age pension personal schemes, Old age 
means tested welfare schemes, Early retirement schemes, Other old age related schemes or benefits, Widows pension basic schemes, Widows pension supplementary 
schemes, Widows pension personal schemes, Widows means tested welfare schemes, Other widows benefits, Orphan’s pension/allowance.   5
Table 2 provides some background information about the 1998 pension systems. The 
statutory retirement age is usually 65, except for women in UK and Italy (60), and for all 
retirees in Denmark (67). In the main part of our analysis we consider people aged 65 and 
over (the “elderly”) which, in the Danish case includes some people not yet eligible. In all 
countries, some of the elderly do not receive a pension. In addition, some pension recipients 
are not past retirement age. However, we do not consider early retirement in this paper, 
although this is a key issue for the sustainability of some pension systems: notably that of 
Italy among the four countries that we consider.
9 
 
Table 2. State pension incomes in 1998 in four EU countries: some key figures 
  Denmark Germany  Italy  UK 
Pension age
1 67  (65)  65  65/60  65/60 
Maximum public pension for a 
single person
2 
14,726  No max.  No max.  13,666 
Minimum public pension for a 
single person
3 
6,276 No  min. 4,684  4,784/1,198 
Minimum income level, single 






Poverty line (single person)
4 10,263  8,346  6,275  7,747 
% elderly with public pension 
income
5  
88 90 81 98 
% elderly below the poverty line 
with public pension income
5 
89 74 76 98 
% elderly with private pension 
income 
n/a 21  1  54 
% employed people aged < 65 
paying state pension contributions 
100 77  99 87 
Income  ratio  0.67 0.92 1.00 0.81 
Sources: EUROMOD, unless otherwise specified; n/a – not available 
Notes: Except where otherwise stated money amounts are in 1998 Euro per year using the following 
exchange rates per Euro (December 31 1998) DK: 7.4587, DE: 1.9558, IT: 1936.3,UK: 0.7032. These 
exchange rates have not been adjusted for purchasing power differences. Money amounts in this table should 
be compared within columns, not between columns. However, even information within columns has been 
drawn from a variety of sources for a range of years and is not necessarily fully comparable.  
1. Economic Policy Committee (2002) Table 3.2. Men/women; (after 1998 reforms) 
2. For DK this includes maximum old age pension plus maximum ATP; UK includes basic pension plus 
maximum SERPS 
3. "Minimum pension" has different meanings in different contexts. For UK this is the full basic state 
pension/minimum basic state pension for those with minimum contributions leading to a pension. For DK it is 
the full "basic amount" of the old age pension for someone meeting the residency requirement in full. A 
pensioner with no other income would be entitled to a means-tested addition. For Italy it is the minimum 
payable to a person with a contribution record 
4. 60% median equivalised income in 1998 Euro per year. Calculated using EUROMOD (see Mantovani and 
Sutherland, 2003; appendix 2) 
5. As defined in section 4.1. 
 
                                                           
9  Using EUROMOD it is difficult to model delayed retirement since its database does not contain the 
information necessary to model the counterfactual of later retirement.    6
Three countries have effective minimum levels of state pensions. These, as well as 
existing minimum income levels, are below the respective national poverty lines (calculated 
for a single person). Thus, it is not surprising that, as shown in Table 3, there are considerable 
proportions of elderly living below the poverty line in all four countries.
 
 
Table 3. Poverty indicators for 1998 in four EU countries: some key baseline figures 
from EUROMOD
 
 Denmark  Germany  Italy  UK 
Poverty rate (all)  11.4  9.9  20.1  19.9 
Poverty  rate  (65+)  31.0 13.9 18.0 22.6 
FGT (a=2) (all)  0.973  0.673  3.131  1.107 
FGT (a=2) (65+)  0.483  0.978  1.189  0.730 
Source: EUROMOD 
Notes: Poverty is defined as income below 60% of median equivalised household disposable income, using 
the modified OECD equivalence scale. 
 
These indicators of poverty before any reforms, as estimated using EUROMOD, 
provide a “baseline” picture against which to measure the effect of reforms.
10 They confirm 
the picture provided by the ECHP data in Table 1 that while the population poverty headcount 
is lower in Denmark and Germany than in the other two countries, it is highest for the elderly 
in Denmark, followed by the UK and then Italy. On the other hand, intensity of poverty is 
lower for the elderly in the UK and Denmark, but higher in Germany. In fact, it is striking 
how the ranking of countries almost completely reverses when one compares the estimates of 
the poverty rate, which only takes into account the extent of poverty, and the FGT(2) which 
also takes into account the intensity of poverty (as well as the degree of inequality in the 
distribution of income among the poor). Table 2 shows that the coverage rates of pensions are 
much lower for the poor than for the population of elderly as a whole in Germany and Italy, 
suggesting that lack of coverage is at least a contributory factor to elderly poverty in these 
countries. On the other hand in Denmark and the UK coverage is just as good for the poor as 
for the elderly as a whole, suggesting that inadequate pensions levels are to blame for poverty 
among the elderly. It appears that pension and benefit systems are successful at either keeping 
the substantial majority of elderly people out of poverty altogether while allowing a minority 
to fall substantially below the poverty line or preventing most from falling far below the 
poverty line through near-comprehensive minimum pension or minimum income schemes, 
even though a considerable proportion of them are located below - but not far from - the 
poverty line. None of the systems considered here either completely fail or completely 
succeed on both grounds. 
                                                           
10  Naturally, due to different reference years, data sources and the fact that taxes and benefits in 
EUROMOD are simulated, a number of figures in Table 3 differ from the corresponding estimates of Table 1. 
See Mantovani and Sutherland (2003) for a discussion. One important source of difference is the treatment of 
non-take-up of means-tested benefits and pensions by pensioners. For simplicity, EUROMOD estimates assume 
complete take-up whereas, at least for the UK, there is evidence of considerable non-take-up (Hancock and 
Barker, 2005). While under 1998 policies this would not make much difference to the poverty rate as measured 
using the proportion in households below 60% of the median, poverty rates using lower poverty lines, or 
measures that take account of intensity such as FGT(2) would be expected to be underestimated using 
EUROMOD.    7
 
3.  Evaluating alternative pension reforms 
  Pension reform is necessarily a long-term process in several different senses. First, 
changes to financing arrangements and to the basis of eventual pension payments are likely to 
take at least one working life to reach maturity. Understanding the consequences for future 
pensioners – and indeed future contributors - of reforms made today is a crucial component of 
the process of evaluating alternative reform strategies. In addition to the obvious difficulties 
in predicting future social and economic conditions there are also uncertainties surrounding 
the extent of political consensus behind reforms. A particular reform package may be adopted 
at one point in time, but will be subject to change as material conditions – and political 
climate – shift over time.
11 So, while it is clear that a dynamic analytical approach of some 
variety is necessary to evaluate the long-term consequences of pension reform, a short- term 
static approach is also informative, particularly in a comparative perspective. It allows us to 
focus on possible individual components of reform packages, taking the direction of reform 
from the longer term strategies. Through such an exercise we can identify potential winners 
and losers under alternative reform scenaria and gain a richer understanding of the underlying 
differences in current institutional arrangements and behavioural patterns of particular 
societies. As a result, we obtain a clearer picture of the specific challenges facing each 
country, of the appropriateness of particular reform strategies and, perhaps, get useful insights 
regarding the political feasibility of proposed policy changes.  
  In addition, we are able to focus on a somewhat different notion of “adequacy” than 
that highlighted in recent official European discussions. Rather than considering the ways to 
encourage greater saving and private pension provision, as a route to the achievement of 
adequate retirement incomes in the future, we consider how to protect and improve the level 
of pension income now, and through the coming period of reform. If political consensus for 
pension reform is to be achieved, and other EU goals in relation to social inclusion are to be 
met, then one important factor will be the extent to which the solidarity component of the 
evolving pension systems protects the incomes of current pensioners [World Bank (1994), 
Gillion et al (2000), ILO (2001)]. One factor in making acceptable the combination of higher 
contributions (or taxes) and lower average replacement rates for public pensions is a 
guarantee that minimum pensions will be maintained through time at an adequate level. Of 
course, the meaning of “adequate” is debatable, and under most criteria would be costly to 
finance. Moreover, it may be argued that the very existence of a guaranteed adequate level 
would reduce individual incentives to save for retirement. However, to make judgements 
about the appropriate balance between improving incentives and ensuring income security 
requires that one understands the costs and benefits of each strategy. This paper is intended as 
a contribution to such understanding.  
  The four countries we consider represent different types of pension systems facing 
different challenges. The German and Italian systems have at their heart an earnings-related 
contributory pay-as-you-go pension. The Italian system is supplemented by minimum pension 
schemes that are designed to make sure that pensioners with low entitlements under the 
earnings-related scheme receive at least a minimum level of pension. There is also a means-
                                                           
11   In fact, some authors dispute the urgency of pension reform in OECD countries on economic grounds 
and claim that the reform agenda that is currently promoted by international organizations and implemented in a 
number of countries is primarily motivated by political considerations (Weller, 2004).    8
tested social pension for elderly people without contributory pensions. The Danish system is 
based on a non-contributory residence-based tax-financed pension. There is a means-tested 
addition and also a, now compulsory, contributory pension that is not earnings-related (but 
depends on hours worked). The UK system has a contributory basic pension plus an earnings-
related contributory state pension that may be replaced by private provision. In all four 
countries there are regulated or incentivised private schemes. With the major exception of the 
UK, and to a smaller extent Germany, these schemes do not yet constitute a significant part 
of pension incomes for current pensioners. See Appendix 2 for more detail about current 
(1998) state pension schemes and contribution arrangements.  
  In the analysis which follows we focus on public pensions and their associated 
contribution systems. To some extent we ignore the parts of the state system that are 
effectively contracted out to private occupational schemes or to personal pension savings 
schemes, even where these are compulsory and regulated by the state, or where they are 
subsidised through tax incentives. The reason for this is that it is impossible to draw a 
common line for all EU systems that divides “public” pensions from “private”. Any choice is 
to some extent arbitrary and here we make a choice based on pragmatic considerations. Using 
the data available to us we are unable to distinguish between all forms of quasi-public and 
private pensions and do not have sufficient information to calculate liability for private 
pension contributions. However, in the case of the UK ignoring state-subsidised private 
pensions would make that the remaining state pension provision appear to be very meagre, 
when compared with the other three systems. For many current pensioners, a significant 
source of pension income is from an occupational defined benefit scheme (in many respects 
similar to continental social insurance schemes and a major source of inequalities between 
elderly men and women in the UK, according to Bardasi and Jenkins (2004)). These 
pensioners (and their employers) have contracted out of the state earnings related scheme and 
paid lower contributions. So in what follows these pensions are included along with state 
pensions for the UK, but not for other countries (where they are much less significant). Thus, 
conclusions that we draw about the UK system relative to the other three should bear this 
departure from comparability in mind.  
 
4. Reform  scenaria 
  We consider three illustrative reforms, first individually and then in combination.  
−  Reform 1 is the introduction of a common minimum pension scheme in all four countries. 
The purpose of this is to strengthen the “solidarity” element of current systems with the 
aim of protecting pension incomes at some acceptable level, while other reforms take 
place. 
We consider two alternative, stylised methods of paying for this minimum, placing the burden 
on the working and the retired population respectively: 
−  Reform 2 is an increase in the rate of the main tax or contribution paid by employees and 
self-employed which finances public pensions. 
−  Reform 3 is a proportional reduction in pensions in payment.  
  In each case we wish to consider the budgetary cost of the reform as well as the 
distributional consequences. In order to be able to compare across countries, we measure the   9
cost of the reform in terms of the proportional change in aggregate household disposable 
income. This is not equivalent to the proportional change in the public budget. When 
comparing different schemes within countries, one can interpret the change in aggregate 
household income as being equivalent to the fiscal cost. However, when comparing across 
countries account must be taken of differing aggregate levels of income and different relative 
sizes of the tax and benefit systems. 
  Changes in poverty are assessed against the poverty line that corresponds to 60% of 
median equivalised disposable income in the baseline (pre-reform) scenario. The poverty line 
does not shift with changes in median incomes.  
 
4.1  Reform 1: A minimum pension 
  In recent years, several European governments have introduced or strengthened 
existing minimum pension schemes. These schemes may be particularly useful in periods of 
pension reform, since they strengthen social solidarity and make the reforms more easily 
acceptable from a political point of view. In this reform scenario, the design of the scheme is 
as follows. The minimum is set at a common proportion of current national average earnings 
(20%, 30%, 40% and 50%). In the central scenario that will be analysed in detail in order to 
understand the mechanics of the reform, the proportion is set at 40%. It is designed as an 
individual pension entitlement, guaranteeing that everyone aged 65 or more who has existing 
public pension rights will receive at least this level of pension income. Any resulting increase 
in pension is treated in the same way by the rest of the tax and benefit system as existing 
contributory pensions. Thus, the gain from the addition of the minimum pension may be 
withdrawn to some extent due to income taxation, contribution payments or reduction of 
income related benefits such as housing benefits. It is intended to be financed out of social 
contributions and so is only available to those who have made their own contributions. It does 
not guarantee a pension to all citizens over the age of 65 and does not improve the situation of 
those with no contributory rights.
12 The amount of the payment is independent of the marital 
status of the pensioner and of the existence of any dependants. It is not income-tested, except 
against other pension income. This is defined as follows, for those aged 65+: 
Denmark: all non-contributory and ATP pension income 
Germany: all contributory pensions and survivors’ benefits 
Italy:  all earnings-related pensions and survivors’ benefits and all existing contributory 
minimum pension payments.  
UK: basic state pension, widow’s pension and SERPs and occupational “defined benefit” 
pensions.  
As explained above, occupational (private) pensions are included for the UK because 
for many people these replace rather than supplement the state earnings related scheme.   
Omitting them from the eligibility test for the minimum pension, combined with the low level 
of the basic state pension, would result in very large proportions of pensioners – including 
some of those with the highest pension incomes – benefiting from the minimum. 
                                                           
12  See Atkinson et al (2002), Atkinson and Sutherland (1998) and Sutherland (1998) for illustrations of the 
effects of comprehensive minimum pension schemes that aim to cover all the elderly.   10
The proportions of individuals aged 65+ in receipt of their own state pension income 
varies across the four countries (see Table 2). The treatment of married women without 
pension rights based on their own contributions also differs. In most countries, pension 
payments are independent of marital status (although in all contributory systems widows and 
widowers inherit some part of their spouse’s contributory pension; in Denmark a widow/er 
has her/his own old age pension rights based on citizenship). In the UK couples receive a 
higher basic pension than single people even if the pension is only based on one set of 
contributions. It is paid partly to the “dependent” spouse. This makes it difficult to determine 
which individuals should have rights to the minimum under this scenario. To aid 
comparability across countries we assume in a second variant that UK women in receipt of a 
state pension at only the dependant’s rate do not qualify for their own minimum pension.
13  
  In all four countries, the great majority of the elderly live either alone or with their 
spouses. It should be noted that the implicit equivalence scale used here in the case of couples 
with two low-pension spouses is higher than the equivalence scale used for the purposes of 
poverty analysis. Thus, ceteris paribus, our scheme is likely to be more effective in fighting 
poverty among elderly (two-pension) couples than among single elderly persons. However, it 
is less likely to be effective for couples with only one pension entitlement between them. 
  Table 4 shows the level of the minimum pension corresponding to 40% of national 
average earnings before tax or employee contributions, and the aggregate effects of 
implementing it. First, in terms of nominal 1998 euro it is clear that the level of the minimum 
varies greatly. Adjusting for purchasing power differences narrows the range but does not 
eliminate it.  
Table 4. Effects of a minimum pension set at 40% average gross earnings 
  Denmark Germany  Italy  UK
1 











2 10,678  10,978  8,005  9,909 
% change        variant 1  variant 2
Household disposable 
income 
1.4 2.9 1.4  4.2  2.2 
Benefits and state pensions  7.5  9.9  5.9  22.2  11.7 
Social  contributions  0.0 1.6 0.0  0.0  0.0 
Taxes  1.8 0.1 1.7  3.2  2.0 
Poverty rate (age 65+)  -63.5  -69.1  -54.4  -96.5  -93.8 
% affected (aged  65+)  82.9 47.5 42.3  79.9  58.1 
Source: EUROMOD 
1. Variant 1 allows married women to qualify on their own account based on pension income arising from 
their husbands’ contributions; variant 2 removes eligibility on the basis of “dependent” pensions.  
2. PPP conversion factors calculated by Eurostat for 1998 and provided in Dennis and Guio (2003). 
 
                                                           
13  This is in fact somewhat arbitrary because some of these women might have made their own 
contributions but are better off claiming a pension as their husband’s dependant than in their own right. So the 
scheme most comparable to that in the other three countries is somewhere between the two variants.   11
  Under variant 1 incomes as a whole rise by 4.2% in the UK compared with 2.9% in 
Germany, and 1.4% in both Italy and Denmark. The second UK variant restricts eligibility for 
the minimum to those receiving a state pension based on their own contributions or those of a 
deceased spouse. This makes a large difference to the cost, reducing it to a 2.2% increase in 
disposable income, lower than the aggregate change in income for Germany. Further 
discussion concentrates on this more restrictive version of the scheme (although it should be 
noted that this treatment is not strictly comparable with that in the other three countries). In 
particular the inclusion of non-state pension income in other countries would reduce the cost 
to some extent. This is likely to be significant only in Germany where 21% of elderly receive 
some amount of this form of income (Table 2). However, it is interesting to note that there is 
very little difference in the impact on poverty in the UK using either of the variants, in spite of 
the large difference in cost. In fact both variants are sufficient to virtually eliminate elderly 
poverty in the UK.  
  The main effect on incomes is directly through the increase in pension income 
although in each country taxes (and in Germany, contributions) are levied on pensions making 
the net aggregate effect lower. In each country income from minimum income schemes is 
replaced to some extent by the minimum pension. The effects are small in Denmark, Germany 
and Italy where the cost of the gross minimum pension is 2-4% higher before taking account 
of withdrawal of social assistance, housing benefits and other minimum income schemes. In 
the UK the effect is much larger: 29% of the gross cost is compensated by a reduction in the 
cost of pensioner means-tested benefits.  
  The impact on poverty rates for the elderly is large with reductions of at least half in 
all countries. This leaves just 4.3% of elderly in poverty in Germany and 8.2% in Italy. The 
reduction of 64% or (19.7 percentage points) in Denmark from a high starting point of 31% 
(Table 3), leaves 11.4% of Danish elderly below the poverty line. The UK case is the most 
dramatic – all but 1.4% of elderly are taken out of poverty by the minimum pension under 
variant 2, a reduction of 94 percent (under variant 1 the poverty rate falls by 97% to 0.8%). 
These effects depend partly on the size of the gains: how far existing pension incomes are 
below the new minimum level, and partly on the position of those with low pensions in the 
household income distribution. These are considered in turn. 
  Figure 1 shows that the distribution of the size of the net benefit varies considerably 
across countries. In Denmark a very large proportion of the population aged 65+ are net 
gainers (83%). However, as many as 34% are gaining less than 10% of their (current) income. 
About the same proportion in the UK as in Denmark (47% and 49%) qualify for amounts that 
lead to gains of more than this. The share of those aged over 64 who experience a very large 
increase in their incomes (over 60%) is considerably higher in the UK than in Denmark – 
13% compared with 3%.  
  Although the cost of this reform scenario is of a comparable relative magnitude in 
Italy and Denmark, in Italy the beneficiaries of the reform among those aged over 64 are in 
the minority with 37% gaining between 10% and 60% of their income (with few gaining more 
than this) and 4% less than 10%. In Denmark more people gain smaller amounts (34% benefit 
by less than 10%) and a small minority (3%) gain very large amounts. The German 
beneficiaries are divided quite evenly between those gaining a lot and those gaining relatively 
little. Germany has the highest proportion of those who gain more than 60% (18%).    12
Figure 1. Increases in household disposable income of people aged 65+  
due to a minimum pension of 40% of average earnings 
Source: EUROMOD 
  Figure 2 shows the average proportional gain in disposable income among all 
households across the income distribution. The distributional effect is partly as a consequence 
of the position in the income distribution of pension recipients. Appendix 3 shows the 
position of pensioners (people in receipt of a pension, regardless of age) and people aged 65+ 
(whether or not they receive a pension). In Denmark pensioners are concentrated at the 
bottom of the income distribution: the concentration of gains from the minimum pension at 
these levels of income shown in Figure 2 is therefore not surprising. In the other three 
countries pensioners are spread more evenly by income level: UK pensioners are to be found 
disproportionately in the lower-middle parts of distribution (deciles 3 and 4) and the number 
of Italian pensioners in the bottom decile group is disproportionately small.
14  
  However, the average gains for households located close to the bottom of the income 
distribution are even larger in relative terms in Germany than in Denmark. This may be an 
indication that even though many Danish pensioners are concentrated at the bottom decile, 
their pensions are not extremely low, at least in comparison with their German counterparts at 
this position in the income distribution. The picture in Italy is less pro-poor since the 
beneficiaries of the reform are more evenly spread across the income distribution, in 
comparison with the other three countries.  
 
                                                           
14  The position of the elderly is similar to that of pensioners although, with the exception of Denmark, 
there is a tendency for the elderly to be more concentrated at lower income levels than those with pension 
income. This effect is not observed for Denmark because many of the 65-66 group (non pensioner elderly) are 




























no change  13
Figure 2. Proportional changes in income by decile due to a minimum pension  
equal to 40% of average earnings 
Source: EUROMOD 
  In order to explore further the relationship between cost and effectiveness in poverty 
reduction among pensioners, other levels of minimum pension are also simulated. Table 5 
shows the level in terms of proportions of average earnings (20%, 30%, 40% and 50%) in 
euro per year, not adjusted for purchasing power, our measure of net cost that can be 
compared across country (percentage increase in household disposable income) and the 
proportion of elderly people in households which gain. The effect of a low level of minimum 
pension (20% of average earnings) is very small in Italy and Denmark. Existing minimum 
pensions are higher in value than this minimum (see Table 2) and the only beneficiaries are 
those not eligible for these existing minima (but in receipt of pension income). There is a 
more substantial effect in Germany and the UK: 14% and 13% respectively of elderly are 
beneficiaries. Generally the relationship between the level of the minimum and its cost is very 
similar in Denmark and Italy: the cost is relatively low at low levels of the minimum because 
few people qualify for small amounts. 
  In the Danish case large numbers of pensioners become entitled to relatively small 
amounts as the level of the minimum rises. Proportionately fewer pensioners benefit in Italy, 
but those who do, on average, gain more. In Germany, implementation of the minimum 
pension is more costly than in the other countries at all levels of the minimum; the cost rises 
in line with the level of the minimum, due to the (mainly) proportional nature of German 
contributory pensions. In the UK the numbers entitled rise steeply between the 20% and 30% 
levels due to the concentration of pensioners on similar levels of income. This is rather like in 
Denmark, but in the UK case the numbers entitled at high levels of the minimum are not so 




















































levels of the minimum the proportions entitled are more like the proportions in Germany, but 
the cost is lower.  
 
Table 5. Effects of a minimum pension scheme, by level of the minimum 
% of average earnings:  20%  30% 40% 50% 
Minimum pension level €/year 
Denmark  6,604  9,906 13,208 16,511 
Germany  5,834  8,751 11,668 14,586 
Italy  3,528 5,292 7,056 8,820 
UK  5,337  8,006 10,675 13,344 
% increase in household disposable income 
Denmark  0.02 0.35 1.40 2.98 
Germany  0.45 1.30 2.87 5.24 
Italy  0.06 0.31 1.38 2.36 
UK  0.08 0.82 2.16 3.94 
% of people aged 65+ that gain 
Denmark  3.7 49.2 82.9 84.9 
Germany  14.3 30.2 47.4 66.3 
Italy  1.5 31.4 42.3 47.7 
UK  12.7 43.3 58.0 63.9 
Source: EUROMOD 
 
  Table 6 provides detailed estimates of the effects of the minimum pension on elderly 
poverty. Clearly, in all countries the larger the minimum pension the larger the reduction in 
the elderly poverty rate. However, the relationships are not equally strong in all countries. In 
Denmark the minimum pension is very effective at reducing elderly poverty from its high 
starting rate. At the 40% level nearly all elderly people who could benefit are in receipt and 
two thirds of those below the poverty line before the reform are now above it. But due to the 
relatively high level of the Danish poverty line, it takes a minimum pension of 50% of 
earnings to raise (nearly all) the final third above the poverty line.  
  In Italy only higher levels of minimum pension are effective at reducing elderly 
poverty. There are two reasons for this. First, a relatively low proportion of Italian elderly 
qualify, leaving 8% below the poverty line even when the minimum pension is at the highest 
level considered. Secondly, it is only at 40% of earnings that the minimum pension is above 
the Italian poverty line. In Germany and the UK the minimum pension level is above the 
poverty line (for a single person) at the 30% level. In Germany the returns, in terms of poverty 
rate reduction, are greater for higher levels of minimum pension up to the 40% level. There is 
little improvement in poverty rate from increasing the level of the minimum pension to 50%, 
even though the proportion gaining continues to rise. Similar “diminishing returns” set in for 
the poverty rate in the UK at 50%, and the numbers benefiting level off too.    
   15
Table 6. Effects of the introduction of minimum pension on poverty among the elderly 
Index  Scenario Denmark  Germany  Italy  UK 
Poverty rate (65+)  baseline  31.0 13.9 18.0 22.6 
  20%  31.0 12.9 17.9 22.1 
  30%  23.1 9.6 16.9  14.6 
  40%  11.4  4.3 8.2 1.4 
  50%  1.7 3.7 7.6 1.2 
FGT (a=2) (65+)  baseline  0.483 0.978 1.189 0.730 
  20%  0.481 0.656 1.181 0.675 
  30%  0.324 0.369 1.003 0.125 
  40%  0.177 0.344 0.624 0.065 
  50%  0.121 0.334 0.491 0.062 
Source: EUROMOD 
 
  Minimum pensions, especially when set at levels equal to, or higher than, 40% of 
average earnings, appear to reduce the elderly poverty rate substantially, particularly in 
Denmark and the UK. On the other hand the intensity of poverty using FGT(a=2) is reduced 
significantly in Germany with quite low levels of minimum (at 20% of average earnings it is 
reduced by nearly one third). Figure 3 shows the returns to higher levels of minimum pension 
generosity in terms of reductions in poverty among the elderly as measured by the FGT(a=2); 
that is, taking into account the impact of the simulated minimum pension schemes on the 
intensity, as well as extent of poverty among the elderly. This clearly shows that in Germany 
and the UK there are levels of minimum pension above which there is rather little 
improvement. For Germany this corresponds to a minimum pension of about 30% of average 
earnings and it appears that this policy cannot reduce poverty as measured by FGT(a=2) to 
less than about a third of its baseline level. This residual must be explained by elderly not 
covered by pension entitlements and hence, not entitled to the minimum. Table 6 shows that 
higher levels of minimum pension do result in reduced poverty rates, indicating that a 
minimum pension of around 40% is needed to raise some remaining pensioners from just 
below to just above the poverty line. A similar picture is apparent in the UK, although a 
higher level of minimum (40%) is necessary to secure large reductions in poverty intensity. 
Poverty is then almost eradicated, indicating that while the level of existing pension is low for 
many UK elderly, coverage is relatively comprehensive.    
  The small residual poverty rate in Denmark at the 50% level of minimum pension 
corresponds to the low income elderly aged 65-66 who were not qualifying for pension in 
1998. The value of the FGT(a=2) remains at 25% of its baseline level, even with the high 
minimum pension in place is a result of, on the one hand, the low level of baseline intensity of 
poverty in Denmark and, on the other, the fact that those not qualifying for pension due to 
being aged under 67 may include a minority with very low incomes. 
  Figure 3 also shows how, in all four countries, the fiscal cost of the introduction of 
minimum pensions appears to rise at an increasing rate with the generosity of the minimum 
pension. The following two sections consider two mechanisms by which this may be 
financed; the first by increasing the fiscal burden on those currently working, and the second 
by redistributing incomes within the pensioner populations.    16
Figure 3. Reduction in poverty among the elderly by levels of generosity of the minimum 
pension 
Source: EUROMOD 
Note: Successive points on each line indicate minimum pension levels equal to 20%, 30%, 40% and 50% of 
average earnings, respectively. 
 
4.2  Reform 2: increasing contributions 
  We explore the impact of increasing contribution rates on the amount of revenue 
raised and on poverty by simulating increases of 1, 2 and 3 percentage points in all rates of 
pension contribution. In Germany this is straightforwardly done: in first case the employee’s 
rate is increased from 10.15% to 11.15% in both East and West Germany. In Denmark the 
rate of tax that finances the old age pension is increased from 8% to 9%. In the UK each of 
the Class 1 rates of contribution (for those contracted out and not contracted out of the state 
earnings related pension) are increased by 1 percentage point (from 8.4% to 9.4% and from 
10% to 11% respectively); the rate on earnings below the lower threshold in 1998 is also 
increased (from 2% to 3%); and the rate on self-employed profits is increased from 6% to 7%. 
In Italy there are many rates for people in different forms of employment and self-
employment: these are all increased by 1 percentage point. We also take account of the fact 
that as well as contributions paid on a proportional basis (within limits) in some contributory 
systems there also are fixed or flat contributions. In these cases we increase the flat payment 
in proportion to the change effected in the main simulation. Such increases also apply in 
Denmark and the UK. 
  Table 7 shows the aggregate effect of the three levels of increase in contribution rates, 
in terms of the proportional change in household disposable income. Within countries, larger 
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40% 40%  17
effects differ across countries with the net effect of a 1 percentage point increase in 
contribution varying from a 1.2% drop in income in Denmark to 0.5% in Italy.
15  
 
Table 7. Aggregate effects of increased contribution rates  
Index Scenario  Denmark  Germany  Italy  UK 
SIC  +1%  -1.22 -0.73 -0.47 -0.59 
SIC  +2%  -2.44 -1.45 -0.94 -1.17 
% change in 
household 
disposable income  SIC  +3%  -3.67 -2.18 -1.40 -1.76 
Source:  EUROMOD        
 
This can be explained by cross-country differences in the structure of the systems of 
pension contribution: a common percentage point increase in rate is of differing significance 
across systems. In Germany a one percentage point increase in pension contribution 
represents a relatively small proportional increase in contribution income as a whole (4.4%) 
as there are other parallel systems of contribution for other purposes (unemployment etc). In 
Italy the proportional increase in contribution income is twice as high as in Germany (8.8%), 
reflecting the greater relative importance of pensions in the contributory system and employee 
contribution rates that are on average lower than in Germany (8-9% in the most common 
scheme). The proportional increase is larger in the UK (10.7%) because the starting average 
rate is relatively low. In Denmark most of the pension system is financed by part of the 
income tax system. A one percentage point increase in contributions represents a 35 percent 
proportional increase in existing contributions, due to the very small starting rate.  
The effects of the increase in contributions according to position in the distribution of 
household income are shown in Figure 4. Since, as shown in Table 7, the aggregate effect of 
the change is not equivalent across countries, the proportional change in income is shown as 
the ratio of the change in each decile group to that of the population as a whole. This 
normalisation allows us to focus on differences in distributional effects, rather than 
differences in the overall size of the impact across countries. 
These effects are quite similar in Germany and the UK with the proportional reduction 
in household income increasing fairly steeply with income up to the top one (UK) or two 
(Germany) decile groups. Ceilings on contributions in both systems make the contribution 
system regressive at higher income levels. This, combined with tax relief on contributions in 
Germany, and the fact that some high earning Germans opt out of the system altogether, make 
the proportional reduction in income less for the top 10% than for the rest of the top 50% 
(Germany) or 40% (UK).  
The Danish system is only slightly regressive at the very top, but less progressive over 
the bottom half of the distribution than the German or UK systems. The Italian system is 
much less differentiated by income level, although this may have as much to do with 
household composition effects as with the contribution burden by levels of gross earnings.
16 
                                                           
15   The effect is net of small changes in current benefit expenditure in all four countries (because some 
income tested benefits are based on income after contributions) and in income tax (except in the UK where 
contributions are not tax deductible).  
16  The net effect of increasing contributions is the average of the effects for each individual within the 
household.   18
In common with Germany and the UK the proportional effect is less in the top decile group in 
Italy than in the rest of the top half of the distribution.  
 
Figure 4. Proportional reduction in income by decile group relative to the mean 
following an increase in social insurance contribution rates by one percentage point 
Source: EUROMOD 
Note that for each decile group the proportional reduction in income is shown as the ratio to the mean 
proportional reduction 
 
Given that the increases in contribution rates affect almost exclusively the non-elderly, 
they are likely to leave the poverty situation of the elderly largely unchanged since in our 
analysis the poverty line is kept fixed. At the same time, to the extent that at least some 
contributors are in households near or below the poverty line, it might be expected that 
increasing contributions might exacerbate poverty in general. Table 8 shows the percentage 
point increase in poverty rates for the national populations following each of the three 
increases in contribution rate. While the effects are generally small, they are largest in Italy, 
where (as shown in Table 2, above) nearly all employed persons pay pension contributions. 
Only 2% of Italian employees in the bottom quintile group by disposable income pay no 
contribution. In Germany and the UK low earnings are exempt from contributions: 29% and 
39% respectively of employees in the bottom quintile group pay no contributions.  
We can conclude that raising revenue to finance pensions through higher contributions 
is most problematic from a distributional point of view in the Italian system. Italian 
contributors are more likely to have low incomes and a significant share of the extra burden is 



































































Table 8. Effects on poverty rates of increasing contribution rates 
Index Scenario  Denmark  Germany  Italy  UK 
Poverty rate (all)  baseline  11.4 9.9 20.1  19.9 
Increase in poverty rate (percentage points) 
  SIC  +1%  0.16 0.04 0.23 0.03 
  SIC  +2%  0.24 0.22 0.45 0.12 
  SIC  +3%  0.32 0.32 0.61 0.22 
Source: EUROMOD        
 
 
4.3  Reform 3: Reducing the replacement rate in contributory pensions in payment 
  This reform scenario focuses exclusively on the incomes of the pensioners. The 
purpose is to gauge the size of savings and the distributional effects on the elderly of a 
proportional reduction of pensions in payment (by 5%, 7% and 10%). Although in a short-
term framework it is very unlikely that pensions can be cut in real terms like this – unless 
there is a severe financial crisis – the common practice of many governments has been to let 
the pensions lag behind incomes from other sources by linking pensions to the Retail Price 
Index rather than average earnings.
17  In this scenario we reduce the earnings-related and flat 
rate contributory components of state pension systems. The main flat rate components are the 
basic pension in the UK and the old age citizens pension in Denmark. These are near-
universal in coverage although the Danish scheme, operating from the age of 67 in 1998, 
excludes some 12% of the elderly because they were aged 65 and 66. The state earnings 
related schemes cover 90% of those aged over 64 in Germany and 87% in Italy. Table 9 
shows the aggregate effects of a 5% cut.  
 
Table 9. Effects of decreasing contributory state pension payments (by 5%) 
% change  Denmark  Germany  Italy  UK 
Household disposable income  -0.27 -0.92 -0.79 -0.23 
Benefits and state pensions  -1.44 -3.25 -3.78 -1.24 
Social contributions  0.00 -0.40  0.00  0.00 
Taxes  -0.34 -0.27 -1.52 -0.18 
Source: EUROMOD 
 
  The importance of the earnings related components, and in particular the lack of a 
ceiling on payments (see Table 2) in Germany and Italy is shown by the large aggregate 
reduction in benefits as a whole – more than 3% in both countries. The effect is mitigated by 
the income tax system, to a greater extent in Italy than Germany. In the former case, pensions 
                                                           
17   Our illustrative reduction in pension payments is also indicative of the effects of other short-to-medium-
term strategies for reducing pension spending available to, or practised by, governments. Replacement rates can 
be reduced explicitly (e.g. as proposed in Germany) or implicitly (by changing the definition of reference 
earnings).    20
are taxed as earnings, whereas in Germany they are taxed much less heavily.
18 On the other 
hand, in Germany pension income itself attracts contributions, which fall along with pension 
income.  
  In the UK and Denmark state pensions make up a relatively small component of total 
benefit expenditure. While pensions are lowered by 5% this represents only a 1.2% and 1.4% 
decrease in total benefits respectively in the two countries. In the UK this is partly because the 
fall in contributory state pension is compensated by an increase in social assistance or housing 
benefits for many low income pensioners. Increases in these benefits make up for about 30% 
of the fall in contributory pension. There is a similar effect in the other three countries but it is 
much smaller: 4% in Denmark and Germany and 3% in Italy.  
  Figure 5 shows the distributional effects in terms of the proportional reduction in 
disposable income across the household income distribution. In Denmark the concentration of 
losses from the pension reduction at low levels of income corresponds with the location of 
pensioners at the bottom of the income distribution (see Appendix 3).  
 
Figure 5. Proportional changes in income by decile following a proportional decrease  




  In the UK, the rather flat distributional effect is due to the compensation of low 
income pensioners by an increase in social assistance benefits. Another feature is the low 
level of UK state pensions in relation to other incomes: a proportional reduction is smaller in 
                                                           






















































absolute size than the same reduction in Italy or Germany. However, it is clear that in all four 
countries a cut in the state contributory pension is a regressive measure due to the position of 
pensioners in the income distribution as a whole: proportional reductions in pensions affect 
disproportionately the lower decile groups.  
Table 10 reports the effects on poverty among the elderly of the proportional cuts in 
pensions. The poverty rate rises in all countries – most in Denmark and, to a lesser extent, 
Germany. Apparently, in these countries a considerable proportion of the elderly are located 
just above the poverty line. Poverty intensity increases too: many of the elderly who are 
below the poverty line and are not eligible for social assistance face a decline in their social 
transfers. Hence, the increase in the FGT(a=2). In fact, after the pension cuts, in all countries 
apart from Germany the proportional increases of the FGT(a=2) are larger than those of the 
poverty rate. 
While the revenues (as measured by the proportional reduction in disposable incomes) 
resulting from the cuts are quite small in the case of Denmark, the impact on the poverty 
measures is the largest, at each level of the cut. The proportional income reductions are larger 
for Germany and Italy, and the impact on poverty indictors is less, reflecting the earnings-
related nature of their pension systems. In the UK both the aggregate income and the poverty 
effects are dampened by the role of income-tested benefits. It seems there is most scope for 
redistribution among pensioners in Germany and Italy but very little in Denmark.  
 
Table 10. Poverty and aggregate income effects of proportional reductions in pensions 
Index Scenario  Denmark Germany Italy UK 
Poverty rate (65+) baseline  31.0 13.9 18.0 22.6 
 -5%  36.8 16.7 18.9 23.8 
 -7%  39.2 17.0 19.7 24.6 
 -10%  42.2 18.6 20.7 25.4 
FGT (a=2) (65+)  baseline 0.483 0.978 1.189 0.730 
  -5%  0.653 1.065 1.334 0.855 
  -7%  0.739 1.107 1.396 0.906 
  -10%  0.894 1.186 1.491 0.985 
-5% -0.27% -0.92% -0.79%  -0.23% % change in total 
disposable income  -7%  -0.38% -1.28% -1.11% -0.32% 
  -10%  -0.54% -1.83% -1.59% -0.46% 
Source: EUROMOD 
 
5 Reform  packages 
  We can combine the three elements of reform into revenue-neutral packages. 
Examination of the individual components above has shown that some types of reform are 
more cost-effective in some countries than in others. There are many dimensions to consider 
and in this first attempt we select, at the national level, combinations of components that 
maximise the reduction in the elderly poverty rate while being mindful of the tax burden of 
the working age population. Focus on alternatives such as the FGT(a=2) indicator for the 
elderly, gender-specific poverty indicators, poverty indicators for the whole population or on   22
the relative incomes of elderly and non-elderly (or many other important outcomes) might 
lead us in different directions. The main purpose at this stage it to demonstrate the existence 
of a range of options and of the need to take national circumstance into account. The packages 
we consider all involve a minimum pension set at 40% of average earnings, together with: 
Denmark:  Percentage point increase in pension contributions (and earmarked taxes): 1.2 
    Change to existing pensions: none 
The rationale for the Danish package is that there is little point in reducing existing pensions 
if they are not earnings related. The cost of the 40% minimum is borne by a large increase in 
taxes/contributions paid by people in employment. 
Germany:   Percentage point increase in pension contributions: 3.0 
    Change to existing pensions: 5% reduction 
Italy:    Change in pension contributions: None 
    Change to existing pensions: 11% reduction 
We have seen that increasing Italian contributions has some impact on poverty. There is 
already significant income inequality among pensioners. So the package involves 
redistribution within pensioner incomes – a large proportional cut in existing pensions. 
UK:     Percentage point increase in pension contributions: 3.3 
    Change to existing pensions: 10% reduction 
The UK package combines all elements. Both the cut in state pensions and the increase in 
contribution rate are relatively large because in each case the base is relatively small. The 
distributional effects of the four packages are shown in Table 11.  
 
Table 11. Distributional effects of the reform packages 
Index  Scenario Denmark  Germany  Italy  UK 
Income ratio  baseline  0.67 0.92 1.00 0.81 
  reform  0.76 1.03 1.03 0.90 
  change  0.09 0.11 0.02 0.09 
Poverty rate (all)  baseline  11.4 9.9 20.1  19.9 
  reform  8.8 8.6  18.5  16.8 
  change  -2.6 -1.3 -1.7 -3.1 
Poverty rate (65+)  baseline  31.0 13.9 18.0 22.6 
  reform  11.4  4.8 8.6 1.5 
  change  -19.6 -9.1  -9.4 -21.1 
FGT (a=2) (all)  baseline  0.973 0.673 3.131 1.107 
  reform  0.941 0.565 3.006 1.012 
  change  -0.032 -0.108 -0.125 -0.095 
FGT (a=2) (65+)  baseline  0.483 0.978 1.189 0.730 
  reform  0.178 0.345 0.658 0.070 
  change  -0.305 -0.633 -0.531 -0.660 
Gini coefficient  baseline  0.207 0.340 0.439 0.330 
(65+)  reform  0.160 0.230 0.396 0.290 
  change  -0.047 -0.110 -0.043 -0.040 
Source: EUROMOD   23
  First, and not surprisingly, the ratio of household income of the elderly rises when 
compared with incomes of other people. This effect is smallest in Italy (the effect is only due 
to the way redistribution occurs across households containing elderly people). The effect is 
particularly large in Germany, in spite of the large cut in earnings related pensions. Poverty 
among the elderly falls considerably in all countries and the net effect of the packages on 
poverty in general is to clearly reduce it. The progressive effect across the distribution of all 
household incomes is illustrated in Figure 5. In UK and Germany decile groups 1 to 5 are all 
net gainers. In Denmark this is the case for decile groups 1 to 3, and for Italy groups 1 to 4.  
 
Figure 5. Proportional changes in household income by decile due to reform packages 
Source: EUROMOD 
 
Another way to look at the distributional impact of the simulated changes but focusing 
exclusively on the elderly is through the examination of the frequency distributions of their 
incomes before and after the reforms.  The evidence is reported in Figure 6. Naturally, in all 
countries the distribution shifts to the right, fewer elderly persons are left below the poverty 
line and in all countries (with the partial exception of Italy) a considerable proportion of the 
elderly are concentrated around the new minimum pension. However, cross-country 
differences are striking.  In Denmark, which has the most concentrated income distribution 
among the elderly, after the reform a twin-peak distribution emerges.  The elderly making up 
the left peak are persons aged over 64 but below state retirement age (67). The elderly around 
the right peak are elderly persons who qualify for the new minimum pension simulated in our 
reform, which is more generous than the minimum pension of the baseline scenario.  Italy has 
the least concentrated income distribution of the elderly among the countries examined here; a 
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Source: EUROMOD. Note that incomes are measured in relation to the pre-reform median. The upper tails of the distributions have been truncated at 3 times median 
income. The proportions of the elderly not shown in each country are 0.05% (Denmark), 0.39% (Germany), 3.98% (Italy) and 1.45% (UK). 
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countries considered a relatively large number of the Italian elderly do not qualify for a 
pension, and at the same time a relatively high proportion share households with non-elderly - 
see below for indirect evidence – the effect of the simulated reform in Italy is not as effective 
in reducing elderly poverty as in the other countries.  In the UK the frequency distribution of 
the elderly has two peaks in the baseline scenario.  In fact, the first of these peaks lies below 
the poverty line.  After the reform, poverty in Britain is almost eradicated with a single peak 
above the poverty line, indicating the high proportion of British concentrated around the level 
of the simulated minimum pension.  Perhaps the most interesting post-reform picture emerges 
in Germany.  Few elderly are left below the poverty line after the reform, while the reform 
produces a twin-peak distribution of the elderly, with both peaks clearly lying to the right of 
the poverty line.  This is due to the fact that many, German low income couples each benefit 
from the minimum pension - these make up the peak on the right. Couples with one 
beneficiary and single beneficiaries are concentrated in the lower-income peak.  
  Figure 7 shows the proportions gaining and losing different amounts, first for the 
elderly and then, on the right-hand of the chart, for the populations as a whole. Denmark 
shows large proportions of elderly gaining both large and small amounts, paid for exclusively 
by relatively small proportional reductions in income among the working age population. In 
contrast, in the other three countries there are some quite large reductions in income. These 
are mainly confined to the elderly. 
 
Figure 7. Gainers and losers from pension reform packages 
 
Source: EUROMOD 
  As shown in Table 11, poverty among the elderly is all but eradicated in the UK. The 
German poverty rate for the elderly also falls to a very low level, and the FGT(2) indicator 































loss > 10%  27
the elderly in Italy is less dramatic than in the other three countries. This is partly because a 
residual group of Italian low income elderly do not qualify for public pensions and are not 
affected by the reform package. As shown in Table 2 above the pension coverage rate is 
lowest in Italy among the four countries considered (81% compared with 88%. 90% and 98% 
in Denmark, Germany and UK respectively). This is part of the explanation for the 
persistence of poverty both in terms of rate and severity in spite of the generous minimum 
pension. Another part of the explanation may lie in the extra burden of other household 
members on pension income. Table 12 shows how pension income is the major source of 
household income for a much larger proportion of younger Italians (aged under 50), than it is 
for the same age group in other countries.  
Table 12: Proportion of people aged under 50 whose household income comprises at 
least half pension income from an elderly person 
%   Denmark  Germany  Italy  UK 
All  0.2 1.6 8.0 1.6 
In bottom quintile group  0.3 3.3  12.1 2.0 
Source: EUROMOD 
 
The difference is particularly marked in the bottom quintile groups where 12% of 
Italians depend on pension income of elderly persons in the same household, compared with 
3% in Germany and 2% in the UK. It is simply that larger increases in pension income are 
needed to push all Italian households containing the elderly across the poverty line.
19 
Finally, we see from the reduction in the Gini coefficient - shown in Table 11 above - 
that the reforms bring about a considerable reduction in inequality among the elderly. Again, 
this is to be expected and but is especially large in the German case. Figure 5 shows 
particularly large average gains at the bottom of the German income distribution. About 18% 
of German elderly increase their incomes by more than 60% whereas the corresponding 
proportions are 12% in the UK and only 3% and 1% in Denmark and Italy respectively.  
 
6 Conclusions 
  We have compared four pension systems and analysed their characteristics by 
discussing a number of illustrative EUROMOD simulations with the aim of highlighting cross 
country differences and similarities and suggesting nationally-appropriate directions for 
reform. In doing so, our approach has been entirely normative and takes little account of 
political economy considerations or indeed, pragmatic political realities. Reform may be 
constrained in ways that we have not considered, although the numbers of gainers and losers 
shown in Figure 7 do indicate something of the relevant “political arithmetic”. Whatever 
reform strategy is adopted in practice may well be sub-optimal in terms of the normative 
                                                           
19   Taking into account that Italy is one of the very few EU countries where a generalised Minimum 
Income Guarantee scheme does not exist, it can be argued that it might be preferable to support this segment of 
the population directly through social assistance policies rather than through generous across-the-board increases 
in existing minimum pension schemes.   28
framework that has been adopted in this paper. While our analysis probably cannot be used as 
a blueprint for realistic reform proposals, it can inform their development. 
  As anticipated, simply applying proportional cuts to state contributory pensions is a 
regressive measure due to the position of pensioners in the income distribution in all four 
countries: proportional reductions in pensions affect disproportionately the lower deciles of 
the distribution. However, in quantitative terms, cross-country differences are quite 
substantial. As a result, additional measures are needed to ensure that reducing the level of 
pensions does not result in increasing pensioner poverty. So we have placed particular 
emphasis on the consideration of a minimum pension scheme as a central component of a 
reform strategy. 
  The relatively generous level of minimum pension set at 40% of average earnings 
makes a big difference to low income pensioners in Germany. Given the relatively high 
inequality among pensioners in this country, we found that the scheme could – within our 
normative framework - be financed at least in part by redistribution within the pensioner 
population. The minimum affects the vast majority of pensioners in Denmark where the 
numbers just below the poverty line are very large. At the core of the Danish pension system 
there is a residence-based flat amount which makes the system virtually comprehensive (for 
those aged 67+) but the pension is set at a low level, just around the poverty line. The 
minimum pension scheme would bring a great many pensioners above it, reducing the elderly 
poverty rate by almost 20 percentage points. The concentration of pensions around the basic 
amount leaves very little room for intra-pensioner redistribution. So the scheme must be 
financed by increasing the tax burden of the non-elderly. The situation in the UK is similar, 
where the provision of a minimum pension of 40% of earnings virtually eradicates poverty in 
old age. However, in this case there is some scope for financing this by reducing existing UK 
earnings related pensions.  
  The effectiveness of the minimum in reducing poverty in Denmark and the UK is due 
to the already near-comprehensive nature of the basic pension schemes in both countries. In 
Italy there are significant gaps in public pension provision, which are duplicated in the 
coverage of the minimum pension that we have simulated and make it, in some ways, less 
effective in this country than in the others. The latter might be exacerbated by the fact that in 
Italy a relatively high proportion of non-elderly persons live with and depend on the pensions 
received by elderly household members. 
  Breaking the link with past contributions, or finding ways of crediting non-
contributors, would improve the distributional effects of the minimum in Italy. This may also 
have a beneficial effect in countries such as the UK where – under the minimum scheme as 
we have simulated it – many couples only receive one entitlement to a minimum payment 
because they have only one contributory pension between them. If each member of the couple 
had their own minimum entitlement it would be possible for the level to be lower while still 
protecting all elderly – singles and couples – from falling below the poverty line. This issue is 
relevant, to some extent, in each country examined and is particularly evident in the German 
case, as shown in Figure 6.  
  More generally there is an important aspect of pensions and pension reform that is 
missing from this paper: an analysis by gender. It is well known that women tend to have 
lower pension entitlements than men because of (on average) lower earnings and less of their   29
lives spent in paid work, and that they are more likely to spend longer in poverty in old age.
20 
It is likely that the types of reform packages that we have considered would be to the net 
benefit of women, at least in the three countries that depend on contributory systems.
21  
Nevertheless, further analysis – which takes account of dependency and survivorship - is 
needed to establish the extent to which this is so.  
  The major challenge identified by most commentators is the growing pressure on the 
public finances due to pensions. So a critical issue is the cost of the reform in relation to its 
beneficial effects. We have explored revenue neutral packages as a way of illustrating the 
different trade-offs across systems and countries. In the future, if the dependency ratio is 
higher or private pension income has grown, the conditions will be different. The approach 
we have taken – exploring reform components individually and in combination – allows us to 
anticipate the effects of packages that are designed to raise revenue or release resources. For 
example, we can see from Table 5 that setting the minimum pension at 30% rather than 40% 
of average earnings would release revenue corresponding to about 1% of average disposable 
income (more in Germany and the UK).
22 Poverty reduction measured using FGT(2) would 
still be considerable and the fall in the poverty rate for the elderly still significant. More 
generally we have seen that the cost is relatively low if (a) the shortfall between the existing 
pension and the minimum level is small (Denmark, UK); (b) the numbers qualifying are small 
(Italy, Germany); or (c) the minimum pension replaces existing means-tested pensioner 
benefits (UK).  
  However, in assessing the balance between the fiscal costs and anti-poverty impacts it 
is important to acknowledge that our comparisons do not capture some important effects that 
may differ in significance across countries. For example, when increasing contribution rates 
we take no account of any effects on employment of increasing non-wage labour costs in this 
way. Likewise, we assumed that the proposed reforms do not affect the savings behaviour of 
the population. More generally we have assumed that there is no “leakage” of revenue from 
increases in contributions through evasion or the development of new avoidance mechanisms 
[Gillion et al. (2000); Manchester (1999)]. Similarly, we have also assumed that the minimum 
pension could be administered in such a way as to achieve 100% take-up. This may be 
possible where existing systems are not fragmented and where a single authority possesses all 
the information necessary to determine entitlement automatically, but perhaps not in other 
cases. Administrative functions and capacities differ across countries, as do cultural norms in 
relation to benefit claiming and tax paying. These aspects matter in practice and could be 
important factors in influencing the relative impact of actual reforms in different countries.  
  The main conclusion that can be drawn from this preliminary exercise is that the 
appropriate direction of reform is not the same across EU Member States. Even if there are 
long term goals in common, the most effective pathways are different. Furthermore, we have 
found conducting policy simulations that are in any way comparable across just four pension 
systems to be much more difficult than we anticipated. A note of caution is needed, not just in 
relation to estimates in this paper, but in any international comparisons of pension systems 
and the estimated outcomes of reforms. The value of a tax benefit model is to allow the 
                                                           
20   The need to address gender inequalities in pension incomes is explicitly recognised in EU-level policy 
statements as part of the pensions “modernisation” agenda. See for example European Council (2003, page 103).  
21   Preliminary analysis seems to confirm this speculation; results available from the authors on request. 
22   The interaction effect of reducing existing pensions would also need to be taken into account.   30
examination of changes individually and in combination: each component can be considered 
in detail but at the same time taking account of interactions with other parts of the system. 
The value of a multi-country model such as EUROMOD is to allow these changes to be 
examined within a comparable framework which is capable of highlighting the existence of 
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Appendix 1. 
EUROMOD base datasets 
 
Country Base  Dataset  for 
EUROMOD 





Denmark European  Community 
Household Panel (W2)  
ECHP 1995  annual  1994 
Germany German  Socio-Economic 
Panel (W15) 
National Panel  1998  annual 1997 
Italy  Survey of Households 
Income and Wealth  
Income survey  1996  annual 1995 
UK Family  Expenditure 
Survey  
Household Budget Survey 1995/6  month  in 
1995/6 
   33
Appendix 2. 




The basic old age pension is a tax financed pay-as-you-go scheme based on length of 
residence and citizenship rather than former income or contribution record. The maximum 
pension is paid on the basis of residence from the age of 15 until retirement at the age of 67 
years (reduced to 65 in 2004). For residence of less than 40 years the pension is paid on a pro 
rata basis. 
 
Danish early retirement schemes depend on voluntary contributions to the unemployment 
insurance have no influence on the old-age pension. This cannot be claimed before the age of 
67 and there is no premium for delaying retirement. 
 
In 1998 the residence based old-age pension consisted of 3 flat rate benefits.  
1. a 'basic amount' of 46,812 DKK (annual basis) which is received by all pensioners; this is 
means-tested on current earnings . However, 95% receive the full basic amount (PPI, 2003). . 
.  
2. a 'supplement' which is 39,576 DKK for singles and 20,568 DKK each member of a 
couple; this is means-tested on income from earnings and capital of both partners with a 
threshold of  43,900 DKK for a single and 88,000 DKK for a couple. The taper is 30 per cent 
for income above the thresholds. For couples where both spouses are old-age pensioners the 
taper is 15 per cent for each. In 2002 64% received the supplement in full (EC, 2003). 
3. a 'special supplement' of 6,828 DKK for singles (not means tested).  
 
The "general contribution" and the "temporary pension contribution" are direct components of 
the income tax scheme. They are levied at a rates of 8% and 1% respectively on all gross 
wages and taxable fringe benefits, and the part of the business income that is categorised as 
personal income.  
 
In addition, there is a social insurance supplementary pension ("ATP"). Contributions are 
compulsory for employees working at least 9 hours a week. Pensions are paid depending on 
the number of contributions and hours of work: they are not earnings-related. If a pensioner 
had worked full time since 1964 when the scheme was established the maximum payable 
would be 16,620 DKK. Some 68% of pensioners receive some ATP (PPI, 2003). This is 
financed by a contribution, a third of which is paid by employees themselves (the remainder 
by employers). The own contribution in 1998 was 894 DKK on an annual basis for full time 
work (27 or more hours per week), for a working week between 18 and 27 hours the rate was 
2/3 and for a working week between 9 and 18 hours it was 1/3.  
 
All contributions are deductible from income for personal income tax purposes.  
 
Private pension schemes do exist, and cover 80% of the current employed workforce but are 
not yet widespread as pensions in payment.  
 
Within an EU perspective the pension system has been categorised as having a replacement 
rate that is "low" but public finances that are "sustainable". (Economic Policy Committee, 
2003; Table 5.1). The main policy challenge is seen as increasing the replacement rate 
through greater occupational scheme coverage (EC, 2003). 
                                                           




Germany operates a contributory pay-as-you-go earnings-related state pension. Pension 
contributions to social insurance are paid half each by employers and employees at a 
combined rate of 20.3% of salary up to a ceiling. The ceiling and the average pension 
payments are different in the former West and East Germany. The contribution assessment 
limit in 1998 was DM 8,400 a month in western Germany and DM 7,000 in eastern Germany. 
Pension payments are also partially subsidised to allow the system to cover people who have 
been carers. 
 
Pensions can be taken early or deferred beyond the pension age of 65, with a corresponding 
adjustment to benefit. The self-employed can make voluntary contributions. There are no 
additions for dependants.  
 
In addition, voluntary company schemes cover about half of men (fewer women) and personal 
pensions (with tax incentives) cover 21% of male and 9% of female pensioners (PPI, 2003).  
 
There is no minimum pension. Social assistance is paid to 1.4% of pensioners (PPI, 2003). 
This acts as a top-up to other incomes.  
 
Within an EU perspective the pension system has been categorised as having a replacement 
rate that is "Medium" and public finances that are "at risk". (Economic Policy Committee, 
2003; Table 5.1). The main challenge is in "maintaining financial sustainability in the face of 




The Italian state pension system is in the process of transformation. In the longer run the 
intention is to mimic a funded scheme by making pensions depends on lifetime contributions 
and aggregate life expectancy and growth. In 1998 the main contributory pension (made up of 
many similar but distinct schemes) was earnings-related based on contributions up to a 
maximum ceiling. Reference earnings were the last 10 years and the proportion of pension 
that is assessed in this way is being gradually reduced as the reforms are phased in, replaced 
by whole working lives.  
 
Retirement could be taken early, and also deferred, but only to 65.  
 
Where entitlement to this pension is below a certain limit (“pensione minima”, minimum 
pension), pensioner is eligible for a means tested supplement (“integrazione al minimo”) up to 
the difference between that limit and the actual entitlement. Relevant income limits are at 
individual and couple level. Full supplement is paid if personal taxable income is lower than 
minim pension and couple income is lower than four times minimum pension, a taper of 
100% is applied to higher incomes. This affects about 39% of people aged 65+. 
 
The Social Pension (now known as “assegno sociale” or social allowance) is a means-tested 
minimum income scheme which covers about 6% of elderly who do not have contributory 
rights.  
 
                                                           
24  See Grabka (2001) and MISSOC for 1998  [http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/soc-
prot/missoc98/english/07/index.htm] 
25  See Atella et al (2001).   35
There are also some occupational defined contribution schemes and some personal tax 
incentivised schemes that are not very widespread. EUROMOD estimates show that just 1% 
of current elderly receive such income (Table 2).  
 
Within an EU perspective the Italian pension system has been categorised as having a 
replacement rate that is "High" and public finances that "appear to be sustainable" but 




The state system was in 1998 made up of (a) a flat rate contributory pension (the "basic 
pension"), (b)  a state earnings-related component, (c) occupational and personal pensions that 
are regulated and may substitute for the state earnings related pension and, for pensioners 
whose income falls below a certain level, (d) a minimum income scheme.  
 
If they meet the contribution conditions (44 years for men; 39 for women in 1998) people 
over state pension age get a flat rate basic pension. If conditions are only partly met, a reduced 
pension of at least 25% of the basic can be paid. Spouses who do not meet the conditions may 
receive a lower pension based on their partner's contributions. At age 80 contribution 
conditions are removed. There is no early retirement; extra pension increments can be earned 
if retirement is delayed. Additions are paid for dependent spouses under pension age (subject 
to a means test) and dependent children. The basic pension is taxable.  
 
For pensioners who contributed to the State Earnings Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) an 
additional earnings-related pension is payable. This is taxable and there are no additions for 
dependants.  
 
Income Support (IS) is the main social assistance benefit for people whose family incomes are 
lower than a specified level and who are not in work for 16 or more hours per week. If family 
income is less than this amount, IS makes up the shortfall. The applicable amount is made up 
of personal allowances and premiums for certain groups with special needs. The level of 
payment of the basic pension is less than the income level offered by IS. Unless they or their 
partners have other sources of income a basic pensioner will be entitled to a top-up from IS.  
 
Social contributions, known as National Insurance contributions (NICs), finance current 
National Insurance (NI) benefits including the NI basic retirement pension. Employees pay 
contributions on their current weekly earnings between a lower and upper earnings limit. 
Employees who are contracted out of SERPS pay a lower rate of contribution. People with 
self-employment income are liable for contributions which only bring entitlement to the basic 
retirement pension, not to any earnings related benefit.  
 
National Insurance contributions are not tax-deductible. 
 
Within an EU perspective the British pension system has been categorised as having a 
replacement rate that is "Low" and public finances that are "sustainable". (Economic Policy 
Committee, 2003; Table 5.1). The main policy challenge is seen as the need to increase the 
replacement rate through more extensive private pension coverage.  
                                                           
26  See Sutherland (2001).   36
Appendix 3. Position of (a) pensioners and (b) people aged 65+ (“elderly”)  
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